FLASHBACK: Professor Admits on Mainstream Television CIA Used Weather Modification Weapons in Vietnam War (OPERATION POPEYE)

Posted by on August 23, 2023 3:00 am

With the constant bombardment of climate change propaganda, let’s revisit an admission to what’s typically considered a ‘conspiracy theory.’

The ‘conspiracy theory’ I’m referencing is weather modification.

Despite government documents, patents, and mainstream television segments, many people refuse to believe authorities modify the weather.

Weather modification and geoengineering go back decades, and the U.S. government has utilized them in warfare.

The Vietnam War is a prime example.

In 2013, “CBS This Morning” contributor Michio Kaku, a physics professor at City College of New York, admitted the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used weather modification weapons in the Vietnam War.

“Even in the 60s, the CIA used this to bring down monsoons in the Vietnam War to wash out the Viet Cong,” Kaku said.

Norah O’Donnell quickly corrected the professor to say ‘allegedly.’

In the clip, Kaku also discussed using lasers to manipulate rain and lightning.

“We physicists are firing trillion-watt lasers into the sky to actually precipitate rain clouds and actually bring down lightning bolts,” Kaku explained.


“Scientists and researchers may one day be able to manipulate rain and lightning using lasers. “CBS This Morning” contributor Michio Kaku, a physics professor at City College of New York, talks to Charlie Rose and Norah O’Donnell about the potential future of weather,” CBS News wrote.

CBS News still has the 2013 video, “Controlling the weather: Is it possible,” on its YouTube:

A rabbit hole dive to share with friends and family oblivious to weather modification is Operation Popeye.

From Wikipedia:

Operation Sober Popeye (Project Controlled Weather Popeye / Motorpool / Intermediary-Compatriot) was a military cloud-seeding project carried out by the U.S. Air Force during the Vietnam War in 1967–1972. The highly classified program attempted to extend the monsoon season over specific areas of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in order to disrupt North Vietnamese military supplies by softening road surfaces and causing landslides.

The former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, was aware that there might be objections raised by the international scientific community but said in a memo to the president that such objections had not in the past been a basis for prevention of military activities considered to be in the interests of U.S. national security.

The chemical weather modification program was conducted from Thailand over Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and allegedly sponsored by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the CIA without the authorization of then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who had categorically denied to Congress that a program for modification of the weather for use as a tactical weapon even existed.

From the U.S. Department of State – Office of the Historian:

274. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, January 13, 1967.


Weather Modification in North Vietnam and Laos (Project Popeye)


1. The Department of Defense has requested our approval to initiate the operational phase of Project Popeye in selected areas (map at clip)2 along the infiltration routes in North Vietnam and southern Laos. The objective of the program is to produce sufficient rainfall along these lines of communication to interdict or at least interfere with truck traffic between North and South Vietnam. Recently improved cloud seeding techniques would be applied on a sustained basis, in a non-publicized effort to induce continued rainfall through the months of the normal dry season.


2. A test phase of Project Popeye was approved by State and Defense and conducted during October 1966 in a strip of the Lao Panhandle generally east of the Bolovens Plateau in the valley of the Se Kong River. The test was conducted without consultation with Lao authorities (but with Ambassador Sullivan’s knowledge and concurrence) and, to the best of our knowledge, remains unknown to other than a severely limited number of U.S. officials.

3. During the test phase, more than 50 cloud seeding experiments were conducted. The results are viewed by DOD as outstandingly successful.

82% of the clouds seeded produced rain within a brief period after seeding—a percentage appreciably higher than normal expectation in the absence of seeding.
The amount of rainfall induced by seeding is believed to have been sufficient to have contributed substantially to rendering vehicular routes in this area inoperable. Since the end of the rainy season, the communists have failed to undertake route repairs and there has been no vehicular traffic.
In one instance, the rainfall continued as the cloud moved eastward across the Vietnam border and inundated a U.S. Special Forces camp with nine inches of rain in four hours.
DOD scientists consider that the experiment demonstrated a capacity to raise and maintain rainfall under controlled conditions to the level at which the land is saturated over a sustained period, slowing movement on foot and rendering the operation of vehicles impracticable.

4. In our view, the experiments were undeniably successful, indicating that, at least under weather and terrain conditions such as those involved, the U.S. Government has realized a capability of significant weather modification. If anything, the tests were “too successful”—neither the volume of induced rainfall nor the extent of area affected can be precisely predicted. The only absolute control, therefore, is after the fact, i.e., to halt cloud-seeding missions.


5. The present DOD proposal would grant authority for the conduct of cloud seeding activities on a sustained basis. For designated areas in North Vietnam, it would mean taking advantage of the present northeast monsoon (the “Crachin”) to increase normal rainfall. The objective is to inhibit overland vehicular movement and to reinforce the bottlenecks already created at stream crossings by the bombing of bridges and ferry installations. With respect to Laos, the objective is to extend rainfall through the dry season (which began in November and continues through April or May), keeping the ground as near the saturation point as possible and obstructing traffic that normally fords streams during the low water period.

6. The assets required for this program are estimated to be very small: extra personnel for existing weather reconnaissance aircraft based in Thailand plus two C–130 aircraft modified for cloud seeding operations with crews, plus supporting personnel. The initial request totals only 33 additional personnel for assignment to bases in northeast Thailand. The cost of the equipment and seeding materials is so low as to be insignificant.

7. A corollary phase of the operation would be to conduct intensified weather reconnaissance and additional experiments in weather modification over international waters in the South China Sea, from Philippine bases—one principal objective being the development of techniques to dissipate cloud cover as well as to induce abnormal rainfall.

8. The proposal differs, in our judgment, from previous weather modification efforts by:

being operational rather than experimental
having military rather than economic or welfare purposes. Approval could thus be considered to constitute a precedent-making decision with major implications for the future. It raises questions in the political, legal, economic, biological, and psychological spheres, many of [Page 547]which cannot be answered adequately in advance of conducting the operation but which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

9. Urgency. DOD wishes to inaugurate operations at once. A prompt decision would (1) enable 7AF to take maximum advantage of present rainy season conditions along coastal areas of North Vietnam, and (2) permit operations in Laos with minimum loss of time between the end of the rainy season and efforts to recreate rainy season conditions along the infiltration routes. With respect to Laos, the period of heaviest anticipated infiltration activity is at hand.

10. Impact in Target Areas. The target areas within North Vietnam are areas of relatively high population density including the town of Dong Hoi, but at least for the first part of the operational period the areas would be undergoing rainy season conditions even in the absence of the proposed operations. It seems reasonable to conclude that the effect of the operation, at least during the normal time span of the wet monsoon, will fall within the range of weather and terrain conditions already experienced at least from time to time. If the operation continued into rice harvest periods, crop damage could result unless seeding was temporarily suspended. The target areas in Laos, by contrast, are characterized by relatively low population density, but the proposed program would drastically change the weather patterns over the next few months—creating to some extent rainy season conditions during normal dry weather periods.

The increased rainfall will inhibit military movement more than civilian movement (to the extent the former is more dependent on motor transport). The effect on military traffic will be to exacerbate difficulties already experienced, to a degree dependent on the extent to which rainfall can in fact be increased on a sustained basis.

The experimental phase of Popeye, conducted during the rainy season, does not provide sure indicators of the extent to which wet weather conditions can be re-created during normally dry periods. But DOD believes the induction of rainfall to be feasible, and to the extent its predictions are realized there would be an undoubted favorable military effect. The road network over which vehicular movement takes place in Laos, despite improvement as well as extension over the past two years, passes through many low-lying areas and is vulnerable to interruption in bad weather, in narrow defiles, along hillsides, and at innumerable stream crossings where bridges do not exist or have been destroyed and where fording is normal practice. Interruption of road traffic would not only retard the normal rate of movement but would also force concentration of trucks that would be more vulnerable to aerial attacks at points known to us because we created the bottlenecks.

Infiltration of troops, on foot, cannot be halted by creation of wet monsoon conditions, although there would be some retardant effect. The [Page 548]same effect would, of course, apply to the freedom of movement and morale of friendly roadwatch and guerrilla teams operating in the same area.

The impact on civilian population will be much the same, in kind, and greater in degree, than that discussed below with respect to areas outside the target zones. The psychological impact will be perhaps greater than any other effect, particularly when conditions characteristic of the rainy season are unexpected.

11. Impact Outside Target Areas. In North Vietnam the impact of successful Popeye operations outside the designated area should be slight. The added rainfall would reach the sea over short distances in the coastal areas where operations would take place or would occur in the mountainous border area that is sparsely populated by tribal peoples. There would likely be some spill over in the form of increased rainfall west of the target areas.

There would be some hypothetical effect of an adverse nature in Thailand where, during the northeast monsoon, normal rainfall might be somewhat diminished as the distance west of the mountains along the Vietnam-Laos border increases. However, as a practical matter, rainfall in the dry areas of northeast Thailand is so slight in this season that any difference resulting from the proposed operation is not likely to be either discernible or meaningful in terms of the water table.

Watch from “Dark Docs”: